Elias Gherbi - France
France was one of the most noteworthy examples in Europe of an immediate post-war political reconstruction happening from within. Since it was eventually decided that the country would remain sovereign after 1945, its reconstruction is unique compared to that of Germany, which was directed by allied powers. It is also different from that of Italy which is coming out of a fascist dictatorship and had no Empire. France seized this moment to create a new political regime, setting up the rules for post-war domestic political life. It is intriguing, however, that it took more than fifteen years of political turmoil and great uncertainty before the Fifth Republic envisioned by de Gaulle was eventually put in place, in quite an authoritative manner. On September 28, 1958, the Constitution of the Vth Republic was accepted by 80% of French citizens via a referendum. The landslide was even more impressive in the Algerian départements: 97% of the population placed its hope in De Gaulle’s constitution (Anderson 2018). The relatively consensual agreement on the extremely unusual and dangerous choice of giving de Gaulle special powers to both govern and draft a new constitution is extremely impressive and must be rooted in sudden changes which prompted a crisis of regime. What led to the apparently urgent, radical decisions of replacing the short-lived 4th Republic with a new regime whose features France had never seen ? Where do those features come from ? Why were they needed ? Were they needed ? Why were they proposed, and why were they accepted ? As Anderson remarks in a 2018 interview, “The Fourth Republic died; should we speak of murder, suicide, or even ‘euthanasia’ as René Rémond suggested?”. We must make up our mind, for there is no complete historiography of May 1958: the event is fossilised in public memory with the classic Gaullist interpretation: the critique of the régime des partis.
I will argue that the unique situation of France with regards to decolonization in Algeria was the single most instrumental factor in the fall of the IVth Republic. A combined intentionalist and functionalist analysis of the events of May 1958 suggests that the post-war changes at work in this conflict were: decolonization, the politicisation of the army, and techniques of psychological warfare. I will then evaluate the relative significance of so-called inaction of the IVth Republic in its demise, arguing that it holds a minor significance only in relation to social and economic challenges of the post-war period. Finally, I will identify De Gaulle’s aura and network, the Myth of Resistance, and a new post-war interventionist paradigm as the reasons for the constitutional features of the Vth Republic.
The quick and precise series of events in May 1958
The IVth Republic fell in May 1958, after 3 parliamentary crises that failed to provide a government that would satisfy the parties and the population, most importantly on the issue of the Algerian war. During the Bourges-Maunoury and Gaillard governments (june 1957-april 1958), Parliament had no stable coalition. In fact President Coty had secretly met with De Gaulle, who informed him that he was not ready to serve France as Prime minister of the IVth Republic (Winock 2006). Political historian Michel Winock’s book The Agony of the IVth Republic is subtitled May 13th, 1958. On this day - the most crucial day for the regime change - Pflimlin is inaugurated as Prime Minister, while a military coup takes place in Algiers. Led by a Committee of Public Salute, controlled by Generals Massu and Salan, the insurgents require direct government support to keep Algeria French and clear the uncertainties of parliamentary debates: it is an anti-parliamentarian movement. The city and most of Algeria will remain in a state of secession until De Gaulle’s ascent to power. In the following days, growing fear of a nationwide military coup powered by an invasion from Algeria will make Pflimlin’s bold “republican defense” waiver until the Assembly finally accepts de Gaulle’s rule as the only way out. One important step in this evolving power fight between the army and the government (both of which faced great internal troubles) was Guy Mollet’s first steps in accepting De Gaulle. The leader of the Socialist group in the Assembly tacitly accepted a potential return to power of De Gaulle with his 3 questions, including: “would De Gaulle accept to present a program to the Assembly, as aspiring Prime Minister ?” (Fox 1959). Seeing the open door, de Gaulle spoke in public for the first time since 1946, in a high-stakes press conference on May 19th. Aware that he had the high ground, he asked for an “exceptional procedure” adapted to “exceptional circumstances” (Winock 2006). He formulated more precise conditions 10 days later: “The Government…would receive for a fixed time the full powers necessary to act in the present very grave situation.. Besides this, a mandate would be given
to the Government .. to prepare and to submit to the country through a referendum the changes that must be made in the Constitution” (Current History, 1958, p 114).
De Gaulle manages to impose such conditions because of the looming menace of the insurgents of Algiers. Winock, in his epilogue, talks of a “coup d’Etat damoclétien”, a “coup d’Etat al dente” which doesn’t follow through, but which plays on “civil-war blackmailing”. Anderson, in his work La guerre civile en France 1958-62, talks unequivocally of a “gaullist coup d’Etat” and compares convincingly General de Gaulle with General Bonaparte, whose 1799 coup was also executed without shedding any blood, and legitimised by a landslide plebiscite. In 1958, the army was in full rupture with the current institutions and the generals of Algiers were planning an invasion of metropolitan France: operation “Resurrection”, named after a quote from de Gaulle’s press conference. To maintain the appearance of control, the government entrusts General Salan, the chief of Algerian military operations, with full powers in Algiers. But Salan makes up his own orders, and is a prominent member of Massu’s Committee. On May 9 he send a threatening telegram to General Ely, military chief of staff, saying “on ne saurait préjuger de la réaction de désespoir [de l’armée]” (Winock 2006). Ely is convinced that “the legal return of de Gaulle will soon be the only chance to avoid rupture with the army”. Legal return, perhaps in its forms. But in such a situation, if a similar reasoning motivated Mollet and the other deputies, it is clear that the army effectively chooses the next head of government. Once invested, de Gaulle’s government even “took some liberties with the program outlined by the Constitutional Law of June 3, 1958, particularly as concerns the scope of legislative powers” (Malézieux 1959), further overlooking the will of Parliament.
Who were the insurgents of Algiers ? Why did they act like that ? The most striking element is the high level of politicisation of the officers. Far from remaining “La Grande Muette”, the army takes on an active role. This post-war change is a consequence of the new type of wars of decolonization, which have 2 features: a military control of large territories, typical of a civil war, and a new form of psychological combat. Hence civil administration disappears, as Winock states: “military logic had suffocated political will” in Algeria. The hijacking of Ben Bella’s plane in 1956, orchestrated without political approval, illustrates the army’s lack of accountability. Winock contends that “the politicisation of the army had, as its chief cause, the will to lead a psychological and ideological war”. The army’s department for psychological warfare, put in place by Lacheroy and inspire by ex-Nazi propagandist Foerth (Anderson 2018), was at work since the Indochina war (another important trauma for the soldiers), notably by solidifying soldiers’ and citizens’ attachment to the “sacred cause” of Algeria (Winock 2006). Some catholic-nationalist predicators, whose papers circulated in the army, gave France the noble and holy role in the war against FLN terrorists. The section of the army which was most sensitive to the ideologue’s influence was Massu’s parachutist regiment. Sometimes likened to SS brigades with their “commando spirit” and “esprit choc” (Thieuloy 1958), the parachutists were especially involved in torture, held strongly anti-parliamentarian views and “a pride of caste, an exaltation of virility, a hatred of intellectuals” (Winock 2006). On May 13th, they fraternised with the crowd of ultra insurgents although they were mandated to stop the protest. Hence the politicisation of both the soldiers (the parachutists) and the officers (Massu, Salan) led directly to the coup of Algiers
Winock concludes that the 13th of May is “un événement politique pur”. This highly intentionalist interpretation rightly emphasised the choices of insurrectionist and military leaders, such as Massu’s declarations at the window of the GG (“De Gaulle au pouvoir !”). But one should not forget that the underlying causes of such an event are powerful ideas ingrained in the spirit of the newly-politicised army. Even further than this functionalist interpretation, Anderson argues within a Marxist structuralist framework that important opposed material interests linked to decolonization constituted the actual rationale for the efforts that the army and the ultras put into maintaining French Algeria. On any interpretation, decolonization conflicts and the politicisation of the army are central. Only, the structuralist argues that the former caused the latter, while the functionalist and intentionalist gives some preeminence to the latter.
Problems within the political structure of the IVth Republic
Debré champions the familiar gaullist interpretation: “c’est la guerre d’Algérie qui a révélé qu’il n’y avait plus d’Etat” (in Trois Républiques pour une France). But we may ask: didn’t the war simply destroy the state ? Why should we think that the state was already decadent before the war ? As Anderson analyses, the omnipresent gaullist myth about the corruption of the IVth republic does much to hide these questions.
It is often trivially said that the political structure of the IVth Republic - a parliamentary regime with a proportional suffrage giving more weight to small or extreme parties (Poujadists, Gaullists and Communists) - made it clearly unadapted to face the challenges of postwar France and the Algerian crisis. Arguments drawn from political science support this interpretation: the chronic government instability, with an average of 7 months in office during the IVth Republic, disappeared immediately with the Vth Republic, which has a 2 year average mandate for Prime Ministers (Winock, 2006). Malézieux provides a detailed argument in The American Journal of Comparative Law: “the French voter was in the most total ignorance of the direct consequences of his vote upon the policy”, because of “the multiplicity of parties” combined with “the appearance of currents of opinion which were anti-democratic and anti-republican, often even anti-French, and the progress of these doctrines, favoured by the helplessness of governments”. The main example is the Communist Party, a force of nuisance acting systematically against governments. As a result, “the great majority of the electoral body professed "Leftist" opinions, but governmental action, sustained by fortuitous majorities which also differed according to the problems dealt with, was oriented toward "the Right." The IVth Republic was not representative of public opinion, and hence unpopular. Similarly, according to E. Fox (1959) the 4th Republic was bankrupt “of ideas” and “of money”.
Was the IVth Republic especially unadapted to face the Algerian crisis ? Surely the instability didn’t help, but the state of French opinion and the structure of interest groups was such that the problem of Algeria had effectively no democratic solution. The entire nation was highly polarised, not only Parliament. I argue that the Algerian war as it unfolded would have toppled any democratic regime; and further, that de Gaulle and his new Republic didn’t resolve the Algerian crisis. As Anderson analyses, the quasi civil war taking place from 1958 to 1962, with daily OAS and FLN attacks, were not solved by de Gaulle. Rather, it is the gradual acceptance of reality among the pieds-noirs, and growing lassitude of the war in metropolitan France, which brought it to an end. Winock corroborates this functionalist-structuralist interpretation when he explains “the explosive myth of French Algeria”, which can be subsumed under the concept of Ideological Blindness. The mantra “l’Algérie, c’est la France” had become a sacred totem, with talks of “the civilizational works of France” concealing the injustices and grudges of the colonial system. Only after 1945 will full rights be given to Algerian natives, and the slogans of “integration” championed as a new totem by the pieds-noirs. But it is too late, as Winock states “two realities seem to escape the insurgents of 13th May and the French political officials: that Algeria is a colony, and that the era of colonies is coming to an end”. Hence “the deadend is total”, “the contradiction is insurmountable” between a full-blown unwinnable war and the impossible acceptance of decolonization. In the end, the belief among soldiers and ultras that the weak political regime was the cause of the war’s inefficacy was clearly more instrumental to the regime change than were the structural weaknesses themselves.
Non-Algerian factors
Yet in a 1948 article, before the Algerian crisis, the Royal Institute of International Affairs brilliantly predicts the Republic’s fall: “historic conditions of revolution are economic distress, a weak and discredited political regime, and the existence of a revolutionary party ready to take advantage of these circumstances. France since liberation has apparently acquired all these pre-requisite” further accurately predicting “The answer, if events follow the French tradition, should not be Fascism, but Bonapartism General de Gaulle is the new Messiah”. The article demonstrates that “The electoral strength of the Radical-Socialists was based on their defence of the financial interests of the farming population, while the right-wing parties were able to protect the industrial and commercial wealth. They could not, however, keep down the expenses of war, national debt, and social services, nor could they prevent the growth of the bureaucracy”. The argument goes like this: a new interventionist paradigm and growing bureaucracy (following the CNR program) necessitated more money, but the centrist parties’ electoral interests were to keep taxes low. An unbalanced budget, printing money, and inflation (x17 from 1939 to 1948) followed. There was no alternative majority than the centrist parties, for “Communists and Gaullists have maintained the tradition of extreme parties in France by following a politique du pire, gently helping on public affairs from bad to worse, in the hope of profiting from a complete breakdown of the existing regime”. The structural paralysis of the regime in the face of i) the emergence of extreme parties and ii) the need for higher government expenses (both post-war changes) could, in this way, be a cause of revolution.
It is interesting that this primary source was written before the Algerian crisis, for it identifies causes that have later been overshadowed by Algeria. I argue, however, that those socio-economic problems were vastly less significant than the Algerian problem, for two reasons. Firstly, the regime survived beyond the 1948 economic troubles into “a phase of exceptional prosperity: industrial growth, full employment, rising stock prices since 1955” and a 2.7 fertility rate which indicated “good national health” (Winock 2006). The first wave of Gaullism had also faded when the RPF was “put to sleep” in 1955. If there might have been a risk of revolution in 1948, it was clearly wiped away in 1958, had it not been for Algeria. Secondly, when comparing France and Italy’s reconstructions - which followed similar patterns with a similar regime - it appears that “the chief cause” of the survival of the Italian regime is “the absence of problems of decolonization” (Winock 2006). This follows straightforwardly from the fact that the only relevant difference between the two countries in 1958 was the presence of a colonial Empire.
So, the IVth Republic’s structural weaknesses led to real problems mostly in the socio-economic realm, and not with regards to the Algerian war. However, the Algerian war seems to be the main cause of its demise. Therefore the Gaullist interpretation gives way too much importance to the intrinsic problems of the IVth Republic in the regime change.
Reasons for the political features of the Vth Republic
The new Republic was the solution which presented itself to resolve the Algerian crisis. Which factors determined its features ? These factors need not bear any link with those leading to the fall of the 4th Republic.
First, the choice of De Gaulle as a solution was not straightforward: “he has no prestige in Algeria, limited prestige in the army. Everything is yet to be done for him to be accepted as the solution” (Winock 2006) The intentionalist framework is highly relevant to understand his acceptance by the Assembly. Winock provides a detailed description of the actors in Algiers on May 13th. The ultras who led the coup, aided by the military, had no specific political affiliation. The clever Gaullist Léon Delbecque (strengthened by the aura of the ex-minister Soustelles, who championed French Algeria) whispered in Salan’s ear for him to launch a call to General De Gaulle at the balcony. His intervention is an essential step. So are the editorials and speeches of Sérigny, Soustelles, Chaban-Delmas and Lacoste: the Gaullist network, or as Winock states, “the General’s shadow”. In the Assembly, Debré explicitly asks Gaullist deputies to “maintain a power vacuum to force the regime to appeal to De Gaulle”. Through the organised and prepared Gaullist network, and De Gaulle’s timely interventions, the gaullist vision for the Vth Republic triumphed, with no coherent contender (except for the feared Communist Party)
Second, de Gaulle’s aura as “l’homme du 18 juin”, a trustworthy Republican saviour, played in his favour towards public opinion. Loewenstein indicates that “the 1958 referendum was a vote on the constitution in the most nominal sense only; rather, it was a plebiscite and as such a most impressive vote of confidence in the person and magic of General de Gaulle.” What constitutes this magic ? Tony Judt reminds us that the Myth of Resistance was “pedagogically enforced all over Europe. Where the historical record cried out against this distortion, national attention was consciously diverted, to examples and stories which were repeated and magnified ad nauseam, in novels, popular histories, radio, newspapers, and especially cinema”, precisely because “no one had an interest in denying it - and within two years to do so was anyway no longer possible”: the parties of the Liberation attempted to reap political benefits from this glorious history. With such a focus on the Resistants, De Gaulle perfectly embodies the nation’s saviour and, most crucially, his record shielded him from any accusation of dictatorial or fascist tendencies. WIth this aura he was able to pass his most cherished constitutional reform - the direct election of the President - in a 1962 referendum of dubious legality, bypassing the Constitution’s art.89 by going directly to the popular vote without Parliament approval
What is Gaullism ? What is new with the Vth Republic ? Loewenstein identifies the specific features of the new Constitution: “Judged by its text alone, the constitution conforms to the constitutional-democratic state organisation. Nonetheless, it signifies, taken as a whole, a radical break with the French tradition of parliamentary supremacy”. This is because of the tools available to constrain Parliament (article 49.3) in a spirit of “rationalised parliamentarism” as well as the direct appeal to the citizenry through referendums “from which previous regimes have always shied away”. The role of the President, the “man of the nation” in De Gaulle’s words, is “assimilated to that of a constitutional or, in the event of a national emergency, of an absolute monarch. Like the monarch the President reigns au-dessus de la mêlée”. The President controls all foreign policy, as he represents national interests. One important cause of this new ambition is that “the role of the President is tailored to the measure of [de Gaulle’s] gothic figure”. The structure of the new regime, with a strong independent leader, mechanically leads to an intentionalist unfolding of history, undermining Andrson’s marxist interpretation. An example is that de Gaulle didn’t become fascist at all, precisely because he had the power to act against the interests of those who brought him to power. Hence a disillusioned Salan leads the failed OAS putsch of 1961.
Despite these discontinuities, the Fifth Republic put into practice the government philosophy of new post-war forces. In his Narratives of Democracy in post-war France (2019), Nord argues that the Republic “was less of a departure than sometimes supposed. The regime reinforced the State’s hand at the expense of parliament, but this process had gotten started decades before. It treated the dissemination of culture as a defining feature of an advanced democracy—think of André Malraux’s 10-year tenure at the Ministry of Cultural Affairs—but Vilar was as much an innovator in the field as Malraux was.” What was new, of course, is the preeminence of the executive, and the international policy. But most domestic policies, Nord states with a functionalist point of view, were the result of “a blending of traditions, Socialist and Catholic”. Following the CNR program, “France got the welfare state that the Socialists had so much desired, but it was organised along familyist and corporatist lines that were pleasing to Christian Democrats.”
Conclusion
To conclude, the regime change in May 1958 was prompted by a complex crisis involving a troubled Parliament and an active politicised army. Its main cause was the Algerian crisis which paralyzed France, with opposed groups stuck in ideological blindness. The IVth Republic had a history of instability, due to its features and to the postwar political climate, which limited its capacity to face postwar economic challenges. Yet its intrinsic flaws in themselves weren't instrumental in its fall. The Vth Republic took roots with its present features because of a series of contingencies: the Gaullist network was the most efficient, the Resistance Myths worked in its favour, and a postwar interventionist paradigm aligned with its project. The principal causes of the crisis remain the turmoils of decolonization and the ideas structuring the minds of the army.
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