Tahmid Rakib – British Bangladeshi
The question of whether it is possible to fit values into a world described by natural science is one that has been vehemently debated over centuries. Natural science is a branch of science that attempts to explain the natural world through empirical observation and the use of scientific testing. It concerns itself with several major disciplines such as physics, chemistry, biology, and astronomy. Due to the use of the scientific method, natural science imparts objective factual data backed up by clear and logical evidence. Values, in contrast, represent the judgements we form on specific subjects. They frequently stem from our opinions and are thus inherently subjective. Examples of values encompass moral and aesthetic judgments. In turn, this essay will analyse different methods of how values may influence natural science, and ultimately, it will show that values cannot fit into a world described by natural science.
The first instance of values in a world explainable by natural science might indeed be aesthetic judgments. Our perception of beauty holds significant influence over our lives. For example, sunsets have been universally regarded as beautiful throughout our lives. This widespread appreciation suggests that certain elements of sunsets evoke a shared sense of beauty. Plato supports this notion in his theory of The Forms, where he argues that the material world is a mere imitation of a spiritual realm known as The Forms, where concepts like beauty are objective. This implies that values such as beauty possess an objective truth recognised by most individuals. Consequently, natural science could demonstrate how beauty, a judgement commonly shared among people, is manifested in the world, thus making it possible for values to fit into a world described by natural science.
However, this explanation for how beauty might be shown in a world defined by natural science presents several issues. Firstly, the concept of a value being objective conflicts with the initial definition of a value. A value is a subjective judgement, so proving it to be objective would turn it into a fact. In turn, if values turn into facts, then it leads to the argument becoming without point, making this explanation insufficient to show that values can fit into a world described by natural science. Additionally, beauty cannot be proven to be innate or objective. John Locke's ideas illustrate that we are born as a blank slate, or 'tabula rasa,' meaning knowledge cannot be innate. Locke argues that for knowledge to be innate, it must be universal and known from birth. The concept of beauty meets neither of these criteria, demonstrating its subjectivity. Thus, it is clear that values such as beauty cannot logically fit into a world described by natural science.
A more sophisticated answer may come from moral naturalism, a metaethical theory, which attempts to bridge the gap between value and fact by arguing that moral facts are synonymous with natural facts. The premise of moral naturalism lies in the inherent connection between moral facts, such as ‘murder is wrong,’ and some natural property that constitutes a natural fact. For instance, one type of moral naturalism is the reductive theory of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism argues that an action is good if it causes the maximum amount of net happiness for the maximum number of people. In this example, happiness is a natural property. Consequently, using utilitarianism, a natural fact is that murder causes pain. Through this, utilitarian naturalists would argue that murder is wrong because murder causes pain, and wrongness is that which does not maximise net happiness. As a result, utilitarian naturalists would say we should not murder, as murder is wrong. Another type of moral naturalism that helps corroborate this view is Aristotelian moral naturalism. Similarly to utilitarianism, Aristotelian naturalism argues for natural properties to be synonymous with moral properties. However, instead of being reductive, the theory argues that an agent is good if it can accomplish its function. Thus, a moral fact like 'murder is wrong’ is logical in Aristotelian naturalism, as murder goes against our function as humans. In turn, like utilitarians, Aristotelian naturalists would believe we should not murder due to it being wrong. Overall, these examples of moral naturalism show how value can fit into a world described by natural science. In moral naturalism, akin to natural science, the application of the scientific method is used. Through this, the value of murder being wrong can then fit into a world described by natural science, as the wrongness comes from a natural property that can be observed and tested. Therefore, naturalism shows how it is possible to fit values into a world described by natural science.
The idea that naturalism aims to bridge the gap between values and facts has been criticised. One of these criticisms is from David Hume and his is-ought gap. The is-ought gap is a concept that argues value statements cannot be derived from statements of fact. This is because no amount of factual data can lead to the conclusion that we ought to do something. To apply this to the examples above, using utilitarianism, just because it is factual that murder will not lead to the maximum net happiness for the majority, it still cannot be concluded that we ought not to murder because of it. This means that, even though we can observe murder causing pain empirically around us, there is no way to presume that this means we ought not to murder. Hume’s concept can additionally be used against Aristotelian naturalism. It may be true and a factual statement that our function as human beings is to care for each other, and thus, murder goes against this function. However, similar to utilitarianism, we cannot conclude that murder is wrong solely based on this premise. Through this, it follows that statements of value cannot fit into a world of objectivity if the value comes from factual statements. Therefore, it is impossible to fit values into a world described by natural science.
However, although it may not be permissible to derive value statements out of factual statements, it seems as if in natural science we use value statements to constantly direct our factual world. For instance, we have halted research in many areas around the world due to ethical concerns. These areas include the Amazon Rainforest and the Great Barrier Reef, where human interaction and research could lead to a loss of biodiversity in the region. Thus, the world that natural science has described seems to be based on our judgments. Furthermore, the world that is described by natural science is usually selected based on value judgments. These judgements may include what areas would be most interesting or make us feel the best. This means that values are able to fit within the world described by natural science by directing where the science we use is aimed at. Therefore, it is not impossible to fit values into a world described by natural science.
One possible claim against the argument that our values direct where we explore in natural science is that these values may not be completely based on our opinions themselves. As aforementioned, values are judgements we make based on our opinions. However, the foundation of opinions may be seen as an ambiguous term. In this context, the term 'opinion' refers to the sum of our experiences, which shape our non-cognitive mental attitudes, or opinions, towards various situations. Due to these non-cognitive mental attitudes being derived from experiences that change from person to person, they become subjective. However, it may be argued that experiences do not entirely make up our opinions. Instead, there is lots of evidence to support the notion that, biologically and psychologically, we innately have certain attitudes towards certain situations. For instance, take the example above of us selecting the area we would like in natural science because it makes us feel the best. The fact that we feel good about picking this route to focus our attention may not be based on our opinions completely; it may be based on the fact that the area makes us feel best because it biologically induces dopamine receptors within us. This biological act may be inherent in everyone, and as a result, it means we pick a specific area to explore. As a result, this would mean our values are not directing us towards a certain parallel to follow. Instead, it would mean that factual judgements of what is best for us are directing us down this path. Therefore, values here do not seem to direct what we explore through natural science. Thus, to a large extent, it is impossible to fit values into a world described by natural science.
In conclusion, it is evident that values cannot easily fit into a world described by natural science. Simple values, such as aesthetic judgements, cannot logically exist as values without being self-contradictory. Additionally, moral naturalism is undermined by Hume's is-ought problem, rendering the argument ineffective. The notion that values could shape our scientific inquiry offers a compelling perspective for a world that is described by natural science. It is clear that our explorations in natural science often stem from internal motivations. However, the extent to which these motivations are values or factual aspects of human nature is debatable. While there are coherent examples of our drive to explore in natural science arising from evolutionary motives, it could be argued that motives like curiosity are value-based. Nonetheless, the degree to which curiosity is not a consequence of biological factors is still up for debate. Ultimately, it is largely true that values cannot fit into a world described by natural science, although the role of values in motivating scientific research remains unclear.
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